GEOFF BENNETT: For perspective on all of this, we turn now to two people with extensive experience dealing with Israel and Iran.

Dennis Ross played leading roles in the Middle East peace process for both Democratic and Republican administrations.

He's now at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

And Alan Eyre had a four-decade career in the U.S.

Foreign Service focusing on the Middle East, including Iran.

He's now a distinguished diplomatic fellow at the Middle East Institute.

Thank you both for being here.

Dennis Ross, we will start with you.

The Trump administration says its talks with Iran are focused on three pillars, the nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and support for proxy forces.

These are things that the Israeli prime minister has been emphasizing for years.

Given that President Trump and Netanyahu apparently have alignment on this, why the need for this hastily arranged meeting?

DENNIS ROSS, Former U.S.

Envoy to Middle East: Well, I suspect there's several reasons for it.

The first reason is that Prime Minister Netanyahu, I think, has some concerns about how Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are approaching the negotiations.

He seems to believe that they're quite anxious for a deal and he wanted to underscore the conditions that would make any deal acceptable.

Being able to do it face-to-face with President Trump is something that obviously he thinks allows him to be more persuasive than to do it over a phone call.

But I think also there's a secondary domestic political reason for this.

He's gone and seen the president more than anybody else.

The president's standing among the Israeli public is quite high, largely because he was seen as producing the release of all the American hostages.

And Bibi wants to be in a position where he can demonstrate, we all know how important Trump is to us and I'm the only one who can manage that relationship.

Look at how often I go.

Look at the impact I have.

GEOFF BENNETT: Alan Eyre, you were part of the nuclear negotiating team for years.

Based on your experience, is Iran realistically willing to accept limits not just on its program, but also on missiles and its support for proxies?

Or is that simply a bridge too far for the regime?

ALAN EYRE, Middle East Institute: That's many bridges too far.

There's -- I think it's highly unlikely that Iran would be willing to accept limitations on its missiles or on its support for proxies.

Even before the 12-day war, it would have been a tough slog to get an agreement on the nuclear issue between this administration and the regime in Iran, largely due to the difference over the question of indigenous enrichment.

When you add that agenda, it becomes exponentially harder.

The U.S.

administration seems to feel that, because Iran is strategically weaker, it can ask for more.

The paradox is, that's actually the exact opposite.

Iran is in many ways too weak to accept what in other situations would have been an acceptable deal, so tough times ahead.

GEOFF BENNETT: Want to shift our focus to Israel, Dennis, because the government there has taken steps that critics describe as accelerating de facto annexation in the West Bank, including changes that make it easier for Israeli Jews to acquire land.

From a U.S.

strategic standpoint, is that in the U.S.

interest?

DENNIS ROSS: It is not.

If you pay attention to the Trump 20 points, point 19 says if the Palestinian Authority faithfully carries out reform, that will create the pathway to self-determination and statehood for the Palestinians.

By the way, no American president had ever publicly endorsed the idea of self-determination for the Palestinians before.

And what you're seeing -- you mentioned critics are suggesting this is de facto annexation.

It's not the critics who are saying.

Minister Smotrich himself says it.

He says it very explicitly.

He says it quite proudly.

He would like to do annexation formally, but short of formally doing it, he wants to do it in step-by-step, day-by-day fashion.

And he's doing it -- what he is doing is ensuring a one-state outcome.

That doesn't seem to be where the 20 points are at least potentially leading.

In any case, what he's doing is designed to foreclose any possibility of a Palestinian state.

GEOFF BENNETT: Alan, if President Trump decides that settlement expansion undermines broader us regional goals, does he have the leverage to stop it?

ALAN EYRE: I think he does, yes.

I think President Trump and this administration at this time is the only entity that can exercise effective leverage on the Netanyahu administration.

President Trump has said he's against annexation.

So there's a serious loss of face were it to go forward.

And it also imperils not just the 20-point peace plan for Gaza, but the Abraham Accords.

And it confirms the slide of the region toward this more Hobbesian state of nature that's not in President Trump's benefit or the U.S.'

benefit.

So, yes, I think he does have leverage.

The question is, will he use it?

GEOFF BENNETT: Alan, is the two-state solution functionally dead or just politically dormant right now?

ALAN EYRE: I would hazard -- Ambassador Ross probably I'm sure has far more insight than I do on this, but I would say, yes, it's deader than Vaudeville.

It hasn't been a realistic possibility for a while.

And with these latest moves, which is just continuation of a disturbing trend on the part of Israel, I think that, for the foreseeable future, it's not a realistic scenario.

GEOFF BENNETT: Dennis Ross, how do you see it?

DENNIS ROSS: Look, I think that in the near term it's not realistic.

The vast majority of Israelis, left to right, feel that, if there's a Palestinian state, it will be led by Hamas or Hamas-like group.

So they're against it.

But the Palestinians themselves are divided at this point.

The traumas that Palestinians have suffered, the traumas that Israelis have suffered mean that being able to bridge the differences between them, at this point, I think, is almost impossible.

I don't think you give up on it, though.

I think what you want to do is preserve it as an option for the future.

Certainly, you want to keep it as something that could be a possibility.

The key thing is to act in a way or at least to prevent actions that make it impossible.

Minister Smotrich, as I said before, his aim is to make it impossible.

No one has to guess at that.

He says it very clearly, and he said it again just the other day.

GEOFF BENNETT: Dennis Ross, Alan Eyre, thank you both for this discussion.

Deeply appreciate it.

ALAN EYRE: Thank you, Geoff.

DENNIS ROSS: You're welcome.